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Theoretical studies have shown that under unorthodox assumptions on preference and produc-
tion technologies, collateral constraints can act as a powerful ampliﬁcation and propagation
mechanism of exogenous shocks. We investigate whether or not this result holds under more
standard assumptions. We ﬁnd that collateral constraints generate a typically small output
ampliﬁcation. Large ampliﬁcation is a “knife-edge” type of result.
JEL classiﬁcation: E32, E44
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Business cycle models typically rely on large exogenous shocks to explain ﬂuctuations in aggregate
output. This approach is often criticized because shocks of the required magnitude are hard to ﬁnd
in the data (Summers 1986, Cochrane 1994). An alternative explanation is that the economy has
some ampliﬁcation mechanism that transforms relatively small shocks into large output ﬂuctuations.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kiyotaki (1998) have argued that such mechanism is a particular
form of credit-market frictions. Speciﬁcally, when debts need to be fully secured by collateral, say
land, and the collateral is also an input in production, then a small shock to the economy can
be largely ampliﬁed. For instance, a small negative shock that reduces the net worth of credit-
constrained ﬁrms forces them to curtail their investment in land. Land prices and output fall
because credit-constrained ﬁrms are by nature more productive in the use of land. The fall in the
value of the collateral reduces even more the debt capacity of constrained ﬁrms, causing additional
∗We thank Daniele Coen-Pirani, David DeJong, Jack Ochs, and participants to the Stanford Institute for Theo-
retical Economics Workshop 2002 for useful comments.
1falls in investment, land prices, and output. The cumulative eﬀect could be dramatic, as they show
using a carefully designed economy.
The results of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) (KM henceforth) have launched a signiﬁcant body of
mainly theoretical research. Examples are Krishnamurthy (1998), Kocherlakota (2000), Caballero
and Krishnamurthy (2001), and Paasche (2001). However, there has not yet been a systematic
assessment of the quantitative signiﬁcance of collateral constraints as an ampliﬁcation mechanism.
This assessment seems particularly important because theoretical models have used some extreme
assumptions in order to boost the ampliﬁcation. For example, KM introduce enough assumptions
to induce constrained agents to fully invest all of the unexpected income; to prevent any response
of the interest rate (lenders’ preferences are linear); and to enhance the role of collateral in the
economy (borrowers’ technology is linear in land).1 Are shocks still signiﬁcantly ampliﬁed under
more standard choices of preferences and technologies?
The objective of this paper is to address this question using a simple dynamic general equi-
librium model. The model is a two-agent closed economy, in the spirit of KM, but modiﬁed to
introduce standard speciﬁcations of preferences and technologies. In particular, all agents in our
economy have concave preferences, have access to concave production technologies, and are re-
quired to collateralize their debts. In order to generate productivity gaps between constrained and
unconstrained agents, we employ the standard, but nonessential, assumption that agents diﬀer in
their discount factors. We constrain the parameters of the economy so that shocks are persistent
and the rational expectations equilibrium is unique around the steady state of the model, i.e., the
steady state exhibits monotonic saddle-path stability. We use the model to examine the features
and parameter values needed in order to achieve large ampliﬁcation.
The main ﬁnding of this paper is that collateral constraints can in fact amplify unexpected
shocks to the economy, but the eﬀect is generally small. For the standard values of a capital share
of around 0.3, and an elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) of 1, the ampliﬁcation is close
to zero. Large ampliﬁcation is a “knife-edge” type of result: on the one hand, it occurs at the right
1Both the appendix of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kiyotaki (1998) attempt to relax some of the unorthodox
assumptions, but there is no assertion on whether these models can generate large output ampliﬁcation.
2combination of a typically small EIS (below 0.2) and a large share of capital (the collateralizable
asset) in the production function. But if the EIS is too small, or the capital share is too large, then
the steady state may not be a monotonic saddle path. Instead, the equilibrium may exhibit jagged
dynamics, or may not even exist.
To understand why the ampliﬁcation is typically small, it is useful to break up the response of
output to a shock in the following four components:
output response = (productivity gap) × (collateral share in production) ×
(production share constrained agents) × (redistribution of collateral).
This expression states that the response of output to shocks is bigger the larger the produc-
tivity gap between constrained and unconstrained agents, the larger the share of collateral in the
production function, the larger the fraction of output produced by constrained agents, and the
larger the redistribution of collateral from unconstrained to constrained agents originated by the
shock. Notice that the ampliﬁcation is caused by the redistribution of collateral from low-productive
unconstrained agents to high-productive constrained agents. The expression suggests that the re-
sponse of output is generally small. For example, if constrained agents are 50% more productive,
produce 50% of the total output, and the collateral share is 50%, then constrained agents must
increase their holdings of collateral by 800% just to increase output in 1%.
More speciﬁcally, there are three main reasons why ampliﬁcation is typically small. First, the
concavity of the production imposes a natural limit on the size of the ﬁrst three components of the
expression above. In that case, the share of collateral is below 1, and there is a trade-oﬀ between
the productivity gap and the production share: a large productivity gap requires constrained agents
to hold a small fraction of the collateral in the economy, which means that their share of the total
production must be small. KM avoid this trade-oﬀ by assuming that the technology of constrained
agents is linear in the collateral.
Second, the concavity of the preferences imposes a natural limit on the size of the fourth
3component. As constrained agents use the unexpected resources from a positive shock to secure
more debt and demand more capital, the interest rate increases to induce unconstrained agents
to provide the additional loans. This response of the interest rate limits the magnitude of the
redistribution of capital and the response of output to the shock. If preferences are linear, as is the
case in KM, then constrained agents can provide the additional loans without any increase in the
interest rate. Thus, the asset price eﬀect emphasized by KM is partially oﬀset by the interest rate
eﬀect when preferences are concave. We ﬁnd that for plausible values of the EIS the response of
the interest rate almost completely eliminates the asset-price eﬀect.
Finally, concave preferences also limit the size of the fourth component in second way. Consump-
tion smoothing implies that part of the unexpected resources are invested and part are consumed.
In KM economy, however, constrained agents invest all the unexpected resources in capital.
The ﬁnding that ampliﬁcation is generally small holds even in the case in which we allow agents
to diﬀer not only in their discount factors, but also in the EIS and the capital share in their
respective technologies. Overall, our results show that for an empirically plausible calibration,
collateral constraints by themselves are not enough to account for the large ﬂuctuations of output
observed in the data.
Our exercise is similar in spirit to Kocherlakota (2000). He shows that the quantitative sig-
niﬁcance of the ampliﬁcation eﬀects generated by endogenous collateral constraints depends cru-
cially on the parameters of the economy, in particular on factor shares. Our paper diﬀers from
Kocherlakota’s in two ways. First, our economy is closed so that the interest rate is endogenously
determined. This allows us to account for general equilibrium eﬀects. Second, as in KM, the distri-
bution of collateral across agents plays a crucial role in our model: this role is lost in Kocherlakota’s
speciﬁcation, which eliminates the leverage eﬀect present in KM.
There is a related literature on the importance of ﬁnancial factors on the investment behavior
of ﬁrms which emphasizes the role agency costs (see, for example, Bernanke and Gertler, 1989;
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist,1999; and Calstrom and Fuerst, 1997 and 2000), and of limited
enforceability (see Cooley, Quadrini and Marimon, 2001). These models do not directly incorpo-
4rate collateral constraints, and consider diﬀerent mechanisms to the ones analyzed here. We study
directly the role of collateral constraints because they can be thought of as the most “extreme”
case of credit constraints. Speciﬁcally, when agents face collateral constraints, borrowing is tightly
constrained by the level of net worth, and so the productivity gap between constrained and uncon-
strained agents is at its largest. This would in principle generate large ampliﬁcation eﬀects because
when agents diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their marginal productivity, redistribution of the productive asset
can increase output substantially.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our basic model economy.
In Section 3 we characterize the dynamics of the model and derive the conditions under which
monotonic saddle-path stability holds for the special case of CRRA utility, and Cobb-Douglas
production function. We also present and discuss numerical simulations. We ﬁrst consider the case
in which agents diﬀer only in their discount factors, and then we allow agents to diﬀer also in the
EIS and their capital share. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Economic environment
Consider an economy inhabited by two types of agents who diﬀer in their rate of time preference.
Agents may also diﬀer in other dimensions such as the degree of risk aversion or the production
technologies. There are two goods in this economy: a durable asset (capital, K), and a non-durable





iui(cit)f o ri =1 ,2
where 1 > β1 > β2 > 0, and cit is consumption of agent i at time t.T h e m o m e n t a r y u t i l i t y
function, ui, is assumed to satisfy usual properties. We allow for the possibility that u diﬀer across
agent’s types. There is a continuum of agents of each type with population size mi > 0, i = {1,2}.
For simplicity, we normalize m2 = 1 and refer to m1 as m. Following steady state considerations,
5we often call agents type 1 lenders and agents type 2 borrowers. Except for the unanticipated
shock, there is not uncertainty in the model.
Agent i produces using a concave technology, fi(ki), where ki is capital and limk→∞ f0
i(k)=∞.
Similar to u, f may also diﬀer across agent’s types. Agents face a budget constraint given by
cit + qt(kit+1 − kit)+ait = fi(kit)+ptait+1
where q is the price of the capital, ait+1 is amount (of consumption good) promised to be paid by
the borrower (includes principal plus interest rates) at t+1,andpt is the price of one unit of such
promise at time t. Agents behave competitively taken prices as given.2
We assume that borrowers can disappear without repaying their loans with no other penalty
than losing their capital. As a result, loans need to be secured by the value of the capital, i.e.
ait+1 ≤ qt+1kit+1.
Capital is available in a ﬁxed aggregate amount, K. This assumption can be interpreted as
either investment taking a long time-to-build, or as the adjustment costs of investment being very
high.3
It is useful to rewrite the budget constraint in terms of the present value of the net wealth,
wit+1 ≡ pt (qt+1kit+1 − ait+1), and the users cost (or down payment) of capital, st ≡ qt − ptqt+1 as
follows:
cit + stkit+1 + wit+1 = xit ≡ fi(kit)+wit/pt−1
where xit represents total resources available to agent i at the beginning of period t. The advantage
of this formulation is that it reduces the individual state vector to one variable, xit, and the collateral
2We exclude the possibility of renting capital. Adding this possibility would not change the perfect-foresight
equilibrium path but it would aﬀect how the economy responds to an unanticipated shock. In particular, shocks
could be less ampliﬁed if capital can be rented.
3As will become clear below, this assumption helps the model to generate larger ampliﬁcation. The harder is to
accumulate capital the larger is the response of asset prices to unexpected shocks, and the larger the redistribution
of resources.
6constraint can now be expressed simply as wit+1 ≥ 0.
2.2 Recursive competitive equilibrium
Let variables in capital letters denote the aggregate quantities corresponding to the variables in
lowercase. Thus, Ki = miki,C i = mici, Xi = mixi,e t c . L e tX be the aggregate state of the
world. X is usually the vector describing the distribution of x across agents, i.e. X = {X1,X 2}.
We will be able to reduce this state vector to an scalar, as will be seen below. Assume that capital
and bond prices can be expressed as functions of the aggregate state of the world: q = q(X), and
p = p(X). Likewise, suppose that X evolves according to the law of motion X0 = G(X).
Each period, agents choose their consumption, ci, stocks of capital, k0
i,a n dw e a l t h ,w0
i so as to
solve the following dynamic programming problem,












given the law of motion for the aggregate state, G(X). Let µi(xi,X) be the Lagrange multiplier
associated to the collateral constraint. The constraint for capital never binds due to the properties
of f. We now proceed to deﬁne a competitive equilibrium for this economy:
Deﬁnition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a set of prices s(X), p(X), value functions V i(xi;X0),
allocation rules ci(xi,X), ki(xi,X), wi(xi,X), and aggregate law of motion G(X) such that:
1. V i(xi,X), ci = ci(xi,X), k0
i = ki(xi,X), and w0
i = wi(xi,X), solve problem (P1), given s(X),
p(X), and the aggregate law of motion G(X).










3. The aggregate law of motion is consistent with the individual decision rules.
This completes the description of the economy and the equilibrium concept. It is important to
stress three features of the model that make it suitable for our purpose. First, the model is a slight
7modiﬁcation of a standard representative-agent economy. If borrowing constraints are eliminated
(or discount factors are identical) then the economy will collapse into a standard representative-
agent economy. The model is thus designed to highlight the role of collateral constraints as the sole
cause for ampliﬁcation and persistence eﬀects.
Second, we make no assumptions to keep the interest rate (the inverse of pt) constant as other
papers in the literature do4. We can thus study if changes in the interest rate dampen or enhance
the asset price eﬀect usually stressed as the key element behind the ampliﬁcation. Third, the model
requires only a small set of parameters on preferences and technologies: the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, factor shares, discount factors, and the mass of credit-constrained agents. We can
use evidence about some of these parameters to impose some discipline in the analysis.
















ci = xi − s(X)k0
i − w0
i (3)
µiwi =0 ,µi ≥ 0,w 0
i ≥ 0( 4 )
The ﬁrst condition equates the marginal cost of holding capital to its marginal beneﬁt. The
second condition states that unconstrained agents equate the marginal beneﬁt of borrowing to its
marginal cost. On the other hand, the marginal beneﬁt of borrowing is larger than marginal cost
for constrained agents.
Notice that if there were no collateral constraints, equations (1) and (2) imply that production
would be eﬃcient, i.e., all agents have the same marginal product of capital. The distribution of
4Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kiyotaki (1998) assume linear preferences or technologies, Kocherlakota (2000)
assumes a small open economy.









where Ke is the capital held by impatient agents. Also, if the production functions are identical for
both types of agents, then Ke = K
1+m, so that all agents would hold the same amount of capital.
2.3 Steady State
Let αi denote the steady state capital share of output for agents type i.T h ef o l l o w i n gp r o p o s i t i o n
summarizes the main properties of the steady state.
Proposition 1. There exist a unique steady state. In steady state impatient agents are credit
constrained, and their capital holdings satisfy K∗



















































Proof: In equilibrium agents of at least one type are not credit constrained. Therefore, equation
(2) evaluated at the steady state implies that
p∗ ≥ βi for i =1 ,2a n dp∗ = βi for at least some i.
9Since β1 > β2, it follows that p∗ = β1 and p∗ > β2.T h u s ,µ∗
2 > 0, i.e., impatient agents are























2 <K e. The remaining equations are easy to derive from equations (1) through (3).
The ﬁrst equation of Proposition 1 states that the steady-state interest rate is completely
determined by the discount factor of the patient agents. The second and third equations stress the
role played by β2 in the model: it determines the degree of ineﬃciency, i.e. the gap in marginal
productivities, as well as the debt to output ratio of the constrained agents. A lower β2 increases
the gap in marginal productivities and reduces the debt to output ratio.
Figure 1 illustrates the determination of the steady state of the economy. The eﬃcient allo-
cation with no debt-enforcement problem would imply K∗
2 = Ke. Notice that in this case, since
agents diﬀer in their discount factor, impatient agents will eventually end up with zero consump-
tion. The existence of credit constraints reduces the borrower’s capital holdings to K∗
2 <K e and,
more importantly, induces a gap in the marginal productivities. This gap is crucial for the model
to generate ampliﬁcation eﬀects. If marginal products were equal in equilibrium, then marginal
changes in the distribution of capital would have no eﬀect on output.
3D y n a m i c s
The previous discussion shows that shocks are ampliﬁed as long as some agents are constrained.
One possible situation is that along the equilibrium path agents may be constrained only for a while.
In order to simplify the analysis and enhance the ampliﬁcation eﬀects we focus on economies in
which constrained agents are always constrained, i.e., W2t(Xt) = 0 for all t. 5 The following lemma
shows that this is in fact the case if the steady state is globally saddle-path stable and monotonic,
and X20 ≤ f2(Ke). By monotonic we mean that X2t monotonically converges to X∗
2.T h u s ,L e m m a
5In equilibrium, W2(X) is only function of the aggregate state of the world, X.
101 states that if borrowers start with a level of resources below their ﬁrst-best level, then they will
always remain below that level.
Lemma 1. Suppose the steady state exhibits monotonic global saddle-path stability and X20 ≤
f2(Ke). Then, W2t(X2t)=0f o ra l lt.
Proof: From Proposition 1, it follows that X∗
2 <f 2(Ke). Since the steady state is monotonic and
saddle-path stable, then X2t <f 2(Ke)i m p l i e sX2t+1 <f 2(Ke). Thus X2t <f 2(Ke) for all t.
This inequality also implies that f2(K2t) <f 2(Ke), or K2t <K e.T h u s ,f0
2(k2t) >f 0
1(k1t)f o r









The last two conditions imply that µ1t =0a n dµ2t > 0 for all t. Thus, borrowers are credit
constrained for all t>0.
Monotonic saddle-path stability also guarantees that the rational expectations equilibrium is
unique, and that deviations from the equilibrium are persistent. Uniqueness and persistence are
usually properties of the rational expectations equilibrium of frictionless economies, but economies
with frictions may also have these properties as is the case of KM or Kocherlakota (2000). Our
model, however, may exhibit multiple equilibria and/or cyclical behavior, or may have no equilibria
at all. It turns out, however, that for plausible parametrizations our model displays monotonic
saddle-path stability as we show below.
From now on we assume that the conditions of Lemma 1 hold so that borrowers are always credit
constrained. We do not provide conditions to guarantee monotonic global saddle path stability, but
rather derive conditions under which such property holds locally around the steady state. These
conditions are provided in the next section. We also comment on the cases in which these conditions
do not hold.
Along credit-constrained paths the aggregate state vector can be reduced to only one variable,
X2.I nt h a tc a s eX2 = f2(K2)s ot h a tK2 is a sole function of X2,i . e . ,K2 = K2(X2). We can then
11solve for X1 as an implicit function of X2 by using the deﬁnition X1 = mf1((K − K2(X2)/m)+
q(X1,X 2)K. Thus, along credit-constrained paths the aggregate state is described by X2 = f2(K2).
For convenience we deﬁne the aggregate state as X ≡ K2 rather than f2(K2). Let K0
2 ≡ G(X)b e
the aggregate law of motion of K2.
When borrowers are credit constrained, their budget constraint (3) becomes
C2(X)=f2(X) − s(X)G(X). (5)







Now, using equation (1) along with (5) and (6), we obtain a two dimensional system of functional
equations in G(X)a n ds(X):
u0
2 [f2(X) − s(X)G(X)]s(X)=β2f0
2(G(X))u0


































This system of two functional equations summarizes the equilibrium of the model. It is clear
from this system that the functional equations only depend on the capital stock of borrowers,
X = K2.6
In order to analyze the dynamics of the model, we linearize equations (7) and (8) around the
steady state and solve the linear system by the method of undetermined coeﬃcients. Let ωz = ∂Z
∂X
6This holds as long as the solution to this system is unique, as guaranteed by the conditions of Lemma 1. Otherwise,
multiple equilibria may arise.
12be the response of a control variable Z = {C1,C 2,q,p,s} to changes in the state variable, X;a n dl e t
ωx = ∂G
∂X describe the motion of the state variable. Deﬁne ui ≡ ui(ci)a n dfi ≡ fi(ki). Linearizing





x + xωsωx = ²2ωx + ζ2ωs − f0
2 (9)
sω2













> 0, and ζi =
³





R 0. Equating these two equations and










This equation provides the solution for ωs once ωx is determined. Substituting this result into
(9) we obtain a second order polynomial equation which roots provide the solutions for ωx
π(ωx) ≡ θ1ω2
x + θ2ωx + θ3 = 0 (11)
where θ1 = s(ζ1 − ζ2)+x(²2 − ²1); θ2 = ²1ζ2 − ζ1²2 + x(f0
1 − f0
2)a n dθ3 = ζ1f0
2 − ζ2f0
1.P r o v i d e d
the solutions for ωx,a n dωs we can solve for ωc1, ωc2, ωq,a n dωp, as shown in the Appendix.
3.1 Symmetric case
To derive more precise results it is convenient to assume speciﬁc functional forms at this point.
Suppose that f(k)=kα and u(c)=c1−σ−1
1−σ ,s ot h a t1 /σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
t i o n .N o t et h a tw ea s s u m et h a tα and σ are the same for both agents, so that they only diﬀer in
their discount factors. We call this case “symmetric”. Next section we study the case in which α
and σ diﬀer across agents.
The following proposition characterizes the restrictions on the parameters (σ,α,β1,β2,m)s u c h
that the steady state exhibits monotonic saddle-path stability.
13Proposition 2. The steady state exhibits monotonic saddle-path stability if and only if









































These conditions state that very large values of σ (i.e., close to zero EIS), low values of m,a n d
certain values of α are not admissible. In other words, the model may display multiple equilibria, in-
stability, and/or cycles in those cases. It is easy to derive the following properties of b σ (α,m,β1,β2)
and e σ(α,m,β1,β2):
Lemma 2. Properties of b σ (α,m,β1,β2)a n de σ (α,m,β1,β2):
• b σ(α,m,β1,β2) > 1a n de σ (α,m,β1,β2) > 1
• b σ(0,m,β1,β2)=b σ(1,m,β1,β2)=∞
• e σ(0,m,β1,β2)=e σ(1,m,β1,β2)=∞
• b σ(α,m,β1,β1)=e σ(α,m,β1,β1)=∞
•
∂b σ(α,m,β1,β1)
∂m > 0a n d
∂e σ(α,m,β1,β1)
∂m is not monotonic in m.
Special economies that satisfy these conditions include an economy with log utility function
(σ = 1); a representative-agent economy (β1 = β2); an economy with a large mass of unconstrained
agents (m →∞ ); and AK or AL type economies (i.e. α ' 1o rα ' 0). On the other hand, the
14larger the steady-state the productivity gap, β1−β2, the smaller the set of parameters (α,m,β1,β2)
that is consistent with monotonic saddle-path stability.
We now study the response of the model economy to an unanticipated shock by using mostly
numerical simulations. Assume that the economy is at the steady state at time zero, and that
a one-time unexpected productivity shock occurs so that production is z0 times the steady-state
production. To ﬁnd the equilibrium path we assume that the recursive solution holds from time
one onward, and ﬁnd the solution at time zero backwards by using the recursive solution for time
t = 1. Details are discussed in the appendix.
The productivity shock z0 provides more resources to both constrained and unconstrained
agents. Since this is a temporary shock, both types of agents save part of the extra resources
in order to smooth consumption. The diﬀerence between the two types of agents is that the un-
constrained are indiﬀerent between buying capital or bonds because they have an interior solution,
while the constrained, who are borrowers, will smooth the shock by buying capital. In fact, con-
strained agents are in a corner solution so that the only way to borrow more is to buy more capital.
Since borrowers’ marginal product of capital is higher, aggregate output increases following the
productivity shock. Thus, the fundamental channel behind ampliﬁcation is the redistribution of
capital toward agents with high productivity.
The two main variables of interest are ampliﬁcation and persistence. We deﬁne ampliﬁcation
as the elasticity of output in period one with respect to a productivity shock in period zero, ²YZ.7
Persistence is measured by ωx.
3.1.1 Ampliﬁcation
Output in period one can only vary if the state variable X1 varies. We can then write ²YZ as the
product of two components: the elasticity of output at time one with respect to X1, ²YX,t i m e s
7The elasticity of output in period zero with respect to a productivity shock in period zero is always 1 in this
model.
15the elasticity of X1 with respect to Z0, ²XZ
²YZ = ²YX²XZ. (14)
²XZ represents the redistribution of capital toward constrained agents. Using the deﬁnition of





















This equation suggests that ²YX is typically a small number. For example, if constrained agents
were 50% more productive, produce half of the total output, and have a capital share of 1/2, then
²YX = 1
8. One can in principle try to increase ²YX by inducing a larger productivity gap and a
larger output share, given certain plausible value for the capital share. There is a limit, however, to
how much can be accomplished this way due to the trade-oﬀ between the productivity gap and the
output share. Under standard concave technologies, a large productivity gap requires borrowers to
hold little capital. But if borrowers hold little capital, then Y2
Y is small. Thus, if the model is to
produce signiﬁcant ampliﬁcation, then ²XZ must be signiﬁcantly large to compensate for the small
value of ²YX. In other words, signiﬁcant ampliﬁcation requires a very large redistribution of capital
toward constrained agents. However, a large redistribution of capital toward constrained agents is
not suﬃcient to guarantee signiﬁcant output ampliﬁcation.
KM show that in their model ²XZ is signiﬁcantly large, in the order of 1
1−β1. They, however,
do not discuss at all the size of ²YZ or ²YX in their model. Their claims about the power of
their propagation mechanism refer only to the redistributive properties of their model but not
to its ability to generate large responses in output. It turns out, however, than under certain
parameterization ²YX c a nb em a d ea r b i t r a r i l yc l o s et o1i nK M ,which implies a large elasticity of
output to the shock. The reason is that constrained agents in their model use a linear technology
16which avoids the trade-oﬀ between the productivity gap and the output share.8
Figure 2 illustrates both the magnitude of output ampliﬁcation and the size of capital redistri-
bution in our model for diﬀerent pairs (α,1/σ), and for β1 =0 .99, β2 =0 .9β1,a n dm =0 .5. As
shown below, our main results are not sensitive to the particular choice of parameters. There are
at least four important observations from this ﬁgure: (i) Output ampliﬁcation is “small” (below
one) for most parameter conﬁgurations. (ii) There are conﬁgurations of parameters that produce
signiﬁcant ampliﬁcation (larger that one). They require a low EIS and large capital share. (iii) The
transition between the area of low to high ampliﬁcation is sharp: ampliﬁcation is generally small,
but it quickly changes to be very large for certain conﬁgurations of parameters. (iv) Although
capital redistribution is also “small” for a large set of parameters, it responds more than output
and can be quite sizeable when the EIS is low and α is large.
An additional important observation is obtained looking more closely into the area of largest
output ampliﬁcation, around the hill of Figure 2. Figure 3.a. shows a top perspective of this area.
The white hump-shaped area corresponds to (α,1/σ) parameters for which monotonic saddle-path
stability does not hold. In other words, parameters on this hump violate the conditions stated in
Proposition 2. Notice how the largest ampliﬁcation, which corresponds to the darkest shade, is
right at the border of the hump. Thus, the conﬁgurations of parameters that produce the largest
ampliﬁcation are at the edge of the space of monotonic saddle-path stability.
Figure 3.b. illustrates the types of dynamic behavior generated by the parameters on the hump-
shaped area. First, the top-left part of the hump corresponds to the area in which the only stable
root is negative. Recall that in Proposition 2 we have ruled out these roots to avoid non-monotonic
dynamics. This area is not interesting because it implies jagged dynamics, which are clearly non-
plausible. Second, notice that most of the hump corresponds to unstable roots, i.e., an area where
there is no forward looking equilibrium. Finally, there are two stretches that correspond to multiple
equilibria cases, i.e. two positive stable roots, and two complex roots. Even though the cases of
multiple equilibria exhibit stable dynamics, one can easily eliminate these cases by allowing agents
8In addition to the linear technology, a low saving rate is required to generate large ampliﬁcation in KM.
17to diﬀer not only in β but also in α and σ, as we do next section.
The previous observations cast doubts on the ability of collateral constraints to produce sig-
niﬁcant ampliﬁcation for two main reasons. First, large ampliﬁcation is not a robust result of the
model. The model produces large ampliﬁcation only as a “knife-edge” type of result: it requires a
very particular combination of parameters at the edge of the space of monotonic saddle-path stabil-
ity. In other words, a small change in parameters can either reduce the ampliﬁcation dramatically,
produce jagged dynamics, instability, or multiple equilibria.
Second, the parameters required to generate large ampliﬁcation are not empirically plausible.
On the one hand, the share of collateral in the production function is probably lower than 1/3 which
is approximately the capital share of output in the U.S. But the results in Figure 2 (and Figure
5 below) indicate that the capital share must be at least 0.5 in order to obtain some signiﬁcant
ampliﬁcation. In addition, the EIS in the U.S. is probably well above 0.3, as recently documented
by Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). However, the results in Figure 2 (and Figure 5 below) indicate that
large ampliﬁcation requires the EIS to be well below 0.2.
It is easy to understand why large ampliﬁcation requires a large capital share. It directly aﬀects
the elasticity of output to the shocks (see equation (14)). It is less obvious to explain why a lower
EIS increases the ampliﬁcation. To understand this, notice ﬁrst that the shock provides more
resources to all agents in the economy. Since the shock is temporary, all agents save part of the
extra resources in order to smooth consumption. Unconstrained agents are indiﬀerent between
buying capital or bonds because they have an interior solution. However, constrained will smooth
consumption by buying capital. They are in a corner solution so that the only way to borrow more
is to buy more capital. Since borrowers’ marginal product of capital is higher, aggregate output
increases following the productivity shock. Consider now the eﬀect of lowering the EIS. In that
case constrained agents spend a larger fraction of the unexpected resources buying capital because
the smoothing motive becomes stronger. Thus, a lower EIS implies an even larger redistribution of
capital toward the more productive agents, and a larger ampliﬁcation.
Up to now we have illustrated the magnitude of ampliﬁcation for pairs (α,1/σ) but for a given
18mass of unconstrained agents, m, and productivity ratio, β2/β1. How does ampliﬁcation depend
on m and β2/β1? Figure 4 illustrates this relationship for given values of α, σ and β1. Notice that
ampliﬁcation is non-monotonic in β2/β1:i tﬁrst increases and then decreases. If β2 is very low,
then borrowers own very little capital in the economy and their eﬀect on aggregate variables is
small. Therefore, ampliﬁcation eﬀects are low. As β2 increases, borrowers own a larger fraction of
capital in the economy, and so ampliﬁcation eﬀects become more important. However, as β2 gets
closer to β1 then the productivity diﬀerentials start to vanish, so that the ampliﬁcation is small.
The impact of m on the ampliﬁcation is mixed but overall a small m seems to help ampliﬁcation.
However, m cannot be arbitrarily small because when there are too many credit-constrained agents
and the productivity shock occurs, there will be a large boom in demand for credit, and the interest
rate may increase so much that the conditions for saddle-path stability may be violated.
It may seem important at this point to come up with some empirically plausible values for β2/β1
and m. However, it is hard to ﬁnd convincing information about this parameters. Fortunately, we
do not really need to know much about these parameters for our purposes. We can choose β2/β1
and m to maximize the ampliﬁcation (²YZ)f o re a c hp a i r( α,1/σ) given a plausible value for β1. This
procedure provides an upper bound for ²YZ. If the upper bound is small, then we must conclude
the model cannot generate much ampliﬁcation. Figure 5 depicts the outcome of this exercise given
β1 =0 .99. It conﬁrms that for empirically plausible values of α and σ the ampliﬁcation is almost
nil. Large ampliﬁcation requires a very large α and a very low EIS.
3.1.2 Prices, persistence, and other variables
In this section we discuss the behavior of some key variables of the model to gain further insight
into the origin of the ampliﬁcation eﬀects. Figure 6 presents the impulse responses of the borrowers’
output Y , capital stock K2, bond prices p, capital prices q, the users cost of capital s, and the split
of Y into C1 and C2. All values are percentage deviations from the steady state. The parameters
used for this simulation are β1 =0 .99, β2 =0 .9β1, α =0 .8, σ =1 5a n dm =0 .3 .F i r s tn o t i c et h a t
at the time of the shock t =0 ,Y increases by 1%, which is the magnitude of the shock, while next
19period t = 1, output reaches a maximum ampliﬁcation of about 1.2%. This ‘large’ ampliﬁcation is
obtained using relatively high values for α and σ.
The panel for K2 clearly shows that the large redistribution of capital across agents is key
to generate ampliﬁcation. Borrowers increase their capital holdings by about 30%. Part of this
increase is explained by increase in the value of the collateral, which increases around 30% the
period after the shock. This large price increase could have produce a much larger redistribution of
capital but the large increase of the interest rate, of around 20%, partially oﬀsets the price eﬀect.
There is an interesting split of Y into C1 and C2: in the period of the shock, borrowers are both
consuming more and buying more capital. In fact, C2 increases around 1%, almost the full increase
in Y . Instead, lenders increase consumption very little in the period of the shock, but they wait
until next period to enjoy the higher returns in bonds. In eﬀect, C1 barely increases at t = 0, but
it is around 0.6% higher than the steady state in t = 1. In summary, as in KM, most of the action
in this model occurs in the period of the shock and is associated to a large redistribution of capital
from lenders to borrowers. This redistribution is so large that prices react substantially.
Finally, it turns out that persistence in the model is generally small, and it is increasing in
α. The reason is that the eﬀects of the shock are persistent in this model as long as borrowers’
net worth is high enough to allow them to continue buying capital. The larger the α,t h em o r e
extra output borrowers obtain from an extra unit of capital, and the higher their net worth is. It
is interesting to note that the region of parameters for which ampliﬁcation is largest corresponds
to close-to-zero persistence in the model. This is so because the largest ampliﬁcation is achieved
with a substantial redistribution of capital toward borrowers, which implies a large increase in the
interest rate that makes this ampliﬁcation eﬀects short lived.
3.2 Asymmetric Case
Up to this point we have discussed simulations in which agents only diﬀer in their discount factors.
One of the conclusions from these simulations is that large ampliﬁcation can be obtained with a
low EIS, and a large, but not too-close-to-one capital share. The evidence on the value of σ is
20controversial, and some of it indicates that the EIS is very close to zero, at least for a set of agents
in the economy (Guvenen, 2002). Thus, an interesting exercise would be one in which we allow
agents to diﬀer in σ. In particular, in order to “help the model” generate large ampliﬁcation, we
would like borrowers to have a low EIS.
Another interesting simulation is to allow for diﬀerent α’s across borrowers and lenders. It is
generally assumed that for the U.S. the aggregate capital share is α =0 .3, but as reported by Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995), α c a nb ei nar a n g ef r o m0 .45 to 0.69 for developing countries.9 If we
want to “help the model” generate large ampliﬁcation, then we can let borrowers have a high α,
and lenders a low α, so that the aggregate capital share is consistent with the empirical evidence.
Figure 7 shows the ampliﬁcation achieved when agents diﬀer in β, σ and α. In particular,
α1 =0 .3, σ1 =0 .1, m =0 .5, β1 =0 .99, and β2 =0 .9β1.T h i s ﬁgure conﬁrms our previous
ﬁnding that ampliﬁcation is typically small. Large ampliﬁcation requires a very large α2 and a
very low EIS for the credit-constrained agent. Finally, notice that all parameter combinations in
Figure 7 guarantee monotonic saddle-path stability, i.e. the hump-shaped area of Figure 3.a. has
disappeared.
4 Concluding comments
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the role of collateral constraints as an ampliﬁcation mecha-
nism of exogenous shocks to the economy. In particular, we analyze a simple deterministic economy
that incorporates the main mechanism proposed by KM. According to this mechanism, what causes
ampliﬁcation is the fact that a group of agents in the economy are credit-constrained and have a
higher marginal product of capital. Thus, adverse shocks to the net worth of constrained agents
negatively aﬀect investment in collateral, output and asset prices. The fall in the value of the col-
lateral worsens the downturn because it further limits the ability of constrained agents to borrow.
We analyze how ampliﬁcation changes for diﬀerent parameters when we allow for standard
utility and production functions. Our approach is to “help the model” generate ampliﬁcation by
9See Table 10.8, page 380-1.
21analyzing equilibrium paths along which a group of agents is always against the constraint. Further,
we also “help” it by considering only unexpected shocks, ruling out a market for renting capital,
and preventing capital from being accumulated. The idea is that if even under these “favorable”
conditions the model does not generate ampliﬁcation, then it would be diﬃcult for more general,
less-stylized models with collateral constraints to do so.
As the simulations indicate, in this deterministic model large ampliﬁcation can be obtained
only with the “right” combination of a low EIS; a large, but not too-close-to-one capital share; and
a sizeable, but not too-close-to-one share of constrained agents. Thus, unless one has this right
combination of parameters, collateral constraints can generate ampliﬁcation when compared with
perfect-market models, but this ampliﬁcation is small.
Our ﬁndings would still hold if agents were heterogenous in other dimensions. Here we introduce
heterogeneity in the discount factors, but this is nonessential. Any heterogeneity that induces
diﬀerences in productivity across agents would produce similar results. This is so because the
fundamental channel to produce ampliﬁcation is the redistribution of a productive asset from lower
to higher-productivity agents. In general, when technology exhibits marginal decreasing returns
in the productive asset, the largest output ampliﬁcation would be attained when this asset is
transferred to agents who hold a very small fraction of it. However, by the same token, since high-
productivity agents hold a very small fraction of the productive asset, their impact on aggregate
production is small. All in all, our results show that collateral constraints by themselves are not
enough to account for the large ﬂuctuations of output observed in the data.
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23AL i n e a r i z a t i o n
Provided the solutions for ωx,a n dωs from equations (9) and (10), the remaining variables can be
solved for. First, ωc1 and ωc2 can be found from equations (5) and (6)
ωc1 = −f0
1 + β1f0
1ωx + xωs = xωs − f0
1 (1 − β1ωx) (15)
ωc2 = f0
2 − β2f0
2ωx − xωs = −xωs + f0
2 (1 − β2ωx) (16)
Note that ωc1 + ωc2 = f0
2 − f0





q(X). From (1) and the


















































ωc1 (1 − ωx). (19)
BA n u n a n t i c i p a t e d s h o c k
Assume that the economy is in steady state at time zero. At that moment, a one-time unanticipated
productivity shock occurs so that total production is z0 times the steady state production. To ﬁnd
the equilibrium path notice that the recursive solution holds true from time t =1o n . G i v e n
t h es o l u t i o na tt i m et = 1, time zero can be solved backwards. The equations that describe the
equilibrium at time zero are (7), (8), (2), and the deﬁnition of st.L e t X0 and X1 be the state
variable at time 0 and time 1 respectively. Then the following equations describe the solution at
time zero
u0


















































This is a system of three equations in three unknowns: X1, s0,a n dq0.D e ﬁne b xt = K2t − K∗
2,
24b st = st − s∗, b qt = qt − q∗,a n db zt = zt − 1. The following is the linearized version of the previous
system, where we used the facts that q∗ = β1 [f0




²2 + ωc2 − f0
2
¢
b x1 − xb q0 + ζ2b s0 = f2b z0 (20)
¡
²1 + ωc2 − f0
2
¢






















b q0 + xb s0 = −mf1b z0 (21)








Equations (20), (21), and (22) can be used to solve time zero values. One can use these solutions
to ﬁnd b c10, b c20 and b p0 as follows
b c10 = mf1b z0 − xb q0 + sb x1 + xb s0
b c20 = f2b z0 + xb q0 − sb x1 − xb s0







(ωc1b x1 − b c10).
C Proof of Proposition 2
We want to derive restrictions on the parameters so that the roots of the following polynomial
equation
π(ωx) ≡ θ1ω2
x + θ2ωx + θ3 =0
are positive and guarantee that the steady state exhibits monotonic saddle-path stability. Recall
that monotonic saddle-path stability requires that the roots are real, and only one of them less
than one.
The idea of the proof is as follows. First we show that it is always the case that π(1) =
θ1 + θ2 + θ3 > 0. Second, we derive conditions under which θ3 < 0. Note that π(0) = θ3.W e
need θ3 < 0 because given that π(1) > 0, if it was the case that θ3 > 0 then we would either have
multiple equilibria (two real or two complex roots, both stable), or unstable roots. Finally, we
derive conditions under which θ1 < 0. We need θ1 < 0 because otherwise there would be a negative
stable root.
Thus, we derive conditions under which π(ωx) is initially increasing, crosses the ωx axis before
1, continues increasing, and then eventually starts decreasing and crosses the ωx axis for a second
time after 1, and tends to minus inﬁnity.
The following are the deﬁnitions
θ1 = s(ζ1 − ζ2)+x(²2 − ²1)















+ s∗ + f0
i = hi + s∗ + f0
i
ζ1 = x −
mc∗
1










Notice that we need θ2




















































2 =( 1− αβ2)Y ∗
2
C∗

























C.1 Solution for θ1 + θ2 + θ3
Using the deﬁnitions of θ1, θ2and θ3












































































C.2 Solution for θ3













2 (β1 − β2) − β1C∗
1 − β2C∗
2)
From this equation, we conclude that θ3 < 0i ﬀ








where the right-hand-side does not depend on σ because the steady state does not depend on σ.









































as shown in the text. Function b σ(α,m,β1,β2) has the following properties:
• b σ(α,m,β1,β2) > 1





Notice that in the representative-agent model, where β1 = β2,t h e nθ3 < 0a l w a y sh o l d s
regardless of sigma. Notice also that the larger the steady-state productivity gap, i.e. the larger
the diﬀerence between β1 and β2,v e r yl o wv a l u e so fσ would not be admissible.
27C.3 Solution for θ1



























































































1−α. Then the previous inequality becomes

































− (1 − α)(1+κ)(1− αβ2)
¸
This is the solution for e σ, as show in the text. Using the deﬁnition of κ this expression can be























































































































































































































































1, 1/σ=0.037, α=0.5, m=0.3
c
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1